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Abstract
Public health insurance and other arrangements covering health costs effectively provide
insurance against changes in health status. These arrangements engage in burden-
smoothing over the life cycle and entail various elements of redistribution. Lack of port-
ability regarding this type of cover may impede international mobility and create financial
losses or windfall gains on various sides, which can lead to risk segmentation across
national health systems. Existing portability rules do not fully address these problems.
In this article, we try to clarify the implications of mobility for typical systems covering
health costs and the requirements which have to be met to ensure full portability. When
individuals are internationally mobile, compensating payments are needed based on
changes in expected net costs in both of the health funds involved. Illustrative simulations
show that this approach may be operative under real-world conditions. (JEL codes: F22,
F55, H51, H73, J6).
Keywords: social insurance, health costs, migration, international portability, fiscal
externalities, risk segmentation
1 Introduction
Public systems providing health insurance or health care are particular in
that they usually offer lifelong cover, at least potentially, for everyone
fulfilling the relevant membership rules. Need for health care is a lifelong
risk, possibly materializing at any point during one’s life cycle, and the
costs can amount to a notable fraction of income or, in extreme cases, may
even exceed it. At the same time, expected health costs have a strong life
cycle dimension, that is, they typically increase at higher ages, while pay-
ments made by the individual to obtain health-cost cover mostly follow
different profiles. Taken together, these aspects imply that international
mobility of individuals almost necessarily raises a portability issue of some
significance. The fact that health care mainly consists of medical services
which can be delivered most easily where individuals are currently staying
adds another difficulty to establishing portability in this area.
Existing legal arrangements regarding the international portability of
health-cost cover broadly define two categories of migrants who are
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subject to different principles. Migrant workers and their family members
are typically offered a ‘package deal’ in their destination country: they are
admitted nearly automatically to the national risk pool for funding health
costs through their legal status when an official work permit is granted to
at least one member of the respective household. The inclusion of inactive
family members is usually a by-product of parallel rules applying to
nationals; where such rules do not exist, family members need separate
cover. All other cases of international mobility, such as nonworking family
members residing outside the workers’ country of employment, or retirees
who move abroad or who return home as pensioners having worked
abroad for a substantial fraction of their active life span, usually give
rise to some amount of ‘cross-border coverage’. Bi- or multilateral agree-
ments leave room for the package-deal solution, but it is otherwise mostly
governed by national law in the destination countries. International law
mainly takes care of the rules for other types of migrants, with rules
defining the conditions under which individuals get access to health ser-
vices in their current countries of residence and with some interaction
between the two health systems involved regarding reimbursements for
the costs of treatment.1
The rationale behind this dual regime is easy to understand—at least
from the perspective of destination countries. Young healthy immigrants
are usually considered a net asset for health systems of the countries
receiving them. They are thus readily admitted (together with their
families), while health systems in sending countries suffer corresponding
losses. Under the current legal framework, workers’ decisions to migrate
can therefore give rise to external costs and benefits of considerable size.
This may eventually have far-reaching consequences for the structure of
risks covered in national health systems in both sending and receiving
countries. Rules for cross-border coverage of nonworking migrants are
potentially less harmful in terms of external effects and risk segmentation.
Nevertheless, uncertainties and practical difficulties in appropriately
assessing reimbursements also create good reasons for shifting responsi-
bility for their health costs across countries in a nondistortive fashion.
Meaningful portability rules for typical public systems of health-cost
cover should take all these consequences into account. Providing insights
as to how these effects could be managed more actively, and more in line
with the economic and fiscal consequences of mobility, is the main ambi-
tion of this article.
1 Cf., in particular, the EU-level rules applying to mobility within the European Union or
bilateral agreements governing mobility between a number of other countries (for a
survey, see Werding and McLennan 2011, Section 3).
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Thus far, the economics of international portability in health-cost cover
are largely unexplored, certainly with respect to publicly provided forms of
cover. Exceptions are given by Holzmann et al. (2005), Avato et al. (2009),
or Holzmann and Koettl (2011) who are chiefly dealing with the portabil-
ity of social protection in a broader fashion. There are a few reviews of the
legal framework for access to health care in foreign countries (Sieveking
2007, Pieters and Schoukens 2009) and of potential repercussions of cross-
border utilization of health services on national health systems (Sieveking
2000, Eichenhofer 2002, or Schulte 2003). In addition, there is some lit-
erature on portability in the context of ‘internal’ mobility, that is, for
individuals switching between insurance providers within countries,
which also bears some lessons for our theme (see Dowd and Feldman
1992, Pauly et al. 1999, or Gruber and Madrian 2002 for the US system
of employer-sponsored private insurance; Meier 2005, or Baumann et al.
2008 for substitutional private health insurance in Germany). To the best
of our knowledge, however, practical arrangements for international port-
ability of health-cost cover have never been analyzed regarding their
appropriateness or even optimality.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 highlights some fea-
tures of health costs which strongly contribute to the difficulties in making
health-cost cover portable, paying attention to the typical age-related pro-
file of average health costs and their differentiation by risk status. In
Section 3, we try to disentangle the various elements of insurance and
redistribution that are involved in most public schemes covering health
costs, and determine the components of costs and benefits which
are shifted around through international mobility under these schemes.
In Section 4, we first discuss in more detail the problems arising from
lack of portability, or from ill-designed portability rules. We then sug-
gest a framework for making health-cost cover fully portable across
health systems and illustrate the policy implications of our approach.
Section 5 concludes, pointing to issues that may deserve further
consideration.
2 Health Costs: Important Features
In most countries, developed ones as well as advanced developing ones,
provision of health-care benefits for the majority of the population is
subject to mandatory arrangements. Institutions covering health costs
are strictly regulated and often run by the state in the form of public
health insurance, or benefits are provided in-kind by tax-financed public
health services. A common feature of all these arrangements is that health
benefits are largely not pre-funded. In this article, we will take as given
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these wide-spread varieties of public systems providing cover for health
costs and discuss our theme against this background.2
Features which contribute to the difficulties involved in establishing
portability in health insurance are the strong life cycle profile of average
health costs (see Section 2.1) and the differentiation of these costs by
health status (see Section 2.2). Here, we will use existing empirical infor-
mation which, despite some limitations, can be used to illustrate the role of
these features for the discussion of portability rules and to provide a basis
for calculations regarding practical issues later on.
2.1 Typical life cycle profiles of health costs
As a rule, average health costs are not flat over an individual’s life cycle.
Instead, they typically increase with age from about age 45 years onward,
with an accelerating rate of increase after age 65 years. The increase tends
to be steeper for males than for females, the latter often having higher
health costs than males between age 15 and 55 years, but relatively lower
health costs afterward. For countries where the relevant data are available,
these observations are almost universal. What can differ substantially
across countries is the level of these profiles, with different per-capita
amounts or different shares in gross domestic product (GDP) spent on
health reflecting huge differences in the cost, quality, and efficiency of
health services provided in each country.
To illustrate these age-related trends, Figure 1 shows sample profiles
based on average public health expenditure for males and females in coun-
tries of the EU-15 and the EU-12. Using procedures described below, we
adjust the data to reflect expenditure profiles for Germany and Poland. The
first is meant to represent the group of relatively rich countries that were EU
members already before 2004 and are typically receiving immigration, not
only from other EU countries. The second represents the less advanced
countries which joined the EU starting from 2004 and have been sending
immigrants to the EU-15 and elsewhere for quite a while now. The selection
of countries and the concentration on EU members is a matter of availabil-
ity of reliable detailed data on health costs.
Originally, the profiles displayed in Figure 1 (taken from Przywara
2010) were measured in terms of percentages of GDP per capita.3 Here,
2 See Werding and McLennan (2011, Sections 3.2 and 4.2) for observations and reflections
regarding parallel problems in private health insurance which is often (fully or partly)
pre-funded. Interestingly, lack of portability, often appears to create a lock-in of individ-
uals in ongoing private health-insurance contracts, sometimes even with a broader impact
on job mobility—a problem which has long been discussed in the USA.
3 Underlying national expenditure profiles are shown in an official document by European
Commission and EU Economic Policy Committee (2009).
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they are converted into nominal values for Germany or Poland by multi-
plying them with per-capita GDP in these two countries as of 2010. The
profiles are meant to reflect costs covered by public health insurance, not
total health costs. This is exactly what is needed to address portability
problems that could arise in public schemes, while such things as patients’
co-payments and out-of-pocket payments are irrelevant in this context.
Where it exists, supplementary private insurance may call for separate
considerations and calculations to become portable, and the implications
for portability may differ. The fact that the profiles are based on a cross
section, not longitudinal data, is also important to note. We will neglect
this issue for the moment, but return to some implications for health costs
arising in different countries, and hence for portability rules, later on (see
Section 3.2).
2.2 Differentiation by risk status
The age profiles of average health costs shown in Figure 1 are the result of
accidental fluctuations in annual health costs around an age-related
upward trend. This upward trend, in turn, results from two components,
viz. an increase in expected health costs for individuals who are basically in
good health and a growing share of individuals whose health status has
Figure 1 Life cycle profile of health costs of males and females in EU-15 and
EU-12 countries (2010). Levels adjusted to reflect data for German and Polish
public health insurance schemes.
Sources: Przywara (2010, Figure 7); own calculations.
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deteriorated. While conceptually clear, the differentiation of health costs
by risk status is hard to pin down empirically, mainly owing to a lack of
sufficiently detailed data. Since relevant data do not exist for Germany
and Poland, we attempt to construct risk-specific health-cost profiles using
micro-data from the US Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, which may be
useful at least for illustrative purposes.4 In doing so, we effectively differ-
entiate between just two broad types of risks:
 ‘Low risks’ who are basically healthy but require some treatment time
and again; on average, they experience a small increase in expected
health costs as they become older.
 A comprehensive class of ‘high risks’ who have developed conditions
requiring more costly treatment more regularly, so that their expected
health costs are permanently increased; this occurs for a growing share
of individuals as people get older.
Figure 2 shows the results obtained for males when we split up average
health cost profiles into risk-specific profiles, again calibrated to data for
Germany and Poland. Our calculations imply that health costs over the
remaining life span are two to three times higher for high risks than for
low risks at all ages. Note that individuals who are high risks in terms of
increased annual health costs could be ‘low risks’ in terms of prospective
lifetime health costs, owing to considerably shorter (contingent) life expec-
tancies that are taken into account in our calculations. However, our cal-
culations suggest that this is not the case, implying that the differentiation
by risk status needs to be addressed in meaningful arrangements for
making health care and health-cost cover portable across countries.5
4 Here, we rely on analyses of these data provided in Herring and Pauly (2006) and on
procedures which are described in much detail in Baumann et al. (2008). Specifically, what
we extract from the MEPS data are processes by which the health status of a given age
cohort deteriorates over time and related relative cost spreads. The results can be applied
to split average health-cost profiles into consistent risk-specific profiles, while higher
levels of US health expenditure become immaterial for our exercise. To obtain a clear
distinction of risk categories, we adjust the definition of two risk classes suggested by
Herring and Pauly (2006) who consider being a ‘high risk’ only as a transitory
phenomenon.
5 The calculations by Herring and Pauly (2006) support this result while, using data from
the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Sun et al. (2010) reach the opposite con-
clusion for individuals aged 65 years and above. Potential reasons are that they are unable
to separate all individuals covered in the HRS into two risk classes, so that they may
effectively concentrate on a subgroup of high risks for whom the cost differential vis-a`-vis
low risks is relatively small; or that they include costs for long-term care (which are less
important for younger individuals and are not covered in the health-cost profiles under-
lying our calculations). Considering the limitations of existing data, this issue clearly
deserves further attention in future research.
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As we are lacking more specific information, procedures and assump-
tions used for splitting up average health costs are applied uniformly to
health-cost profiles for Germany and Poland. This means that differences
between countries are mainly driven by the cost differentials which already
show up in Figure 1. Portability arrangements will have to deal with such
differences—for young people who migrate to a developed high-cost coun-
try and probably also for retirees returning home to a less-developed low-
cost country—while differences between individuals in good health or
poor health contribute to the complications that arise. Last but not
least, one should keep in mind that the way these costs are funded can
be rather different across countries. These differences move to the fore
when we now turn to discussing the nature of public arrangements provid-
ing health-cost cover before approaching the issue of portability.
3 Health-cost Cover: Components and Calculations
3.1 Disentangling public health insurance
Health insurers and other institutions covering health costs are effectively
providing a number of distinct services which need to be disentangled
when addressing the problems involved in making cover for health costs
Figure 2 Life cycle profile of health costs of males in EU-15 and EU-12 coun-
tries, differentiated by risk status (2010). Levels adjusted to reflect data for
German and Polish public health insurance schemes.
Sources: Przywara (2010, Figure 7); own calculations.
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portable across countries. Probably the most basic service of these insti-
tutions is that they act as specialized payment agencies, collecting invoices
related to health services for their customers and reimbursing health-care
providers for their efforts. Besides that, one can distinguish various further
activities that are, or can be, carried out by existing health insurance
schemes. We will divide them into a core set of elements of insurance
and a number of additional elements of redistribution. The list of elements
mentioned here is meant to be exhaustive in that it incorporates, at least in
a rough fashion, all types of services involved in actual arrangements. At
the same time, depending on national traditions and national attitudes
regarding risk-taking and redistribution, actual schemes may fail to com-
prise all of the elements listed here.
(a) Core elements of insurance
In addition to handling payments for health services, covering health costs
often involves one or more of the following elements of insurance: (i) cover
for current health costs; (ii) insurance against prospective deterioration of
one’s health status; and (iii) intertemporal burden smoothing.
Cover for current health costs effectively amounts to an insurance
against accidental deviations in annual health costs from the respective
mean. Although it may be obscured by many other elements distinguished
here, it is part of any arrangement of health-cost funding we are aware of.
To avoid various forms of moral hazard, insurance of this kind may be
limited by co-payments, or insured individuals may have to make out-of-
pocket payments for some types of services. Nonetheless, they are never
exposed to the risk of paying for all their health costs in a given year
without any limitation, which would effectively mean they have no
cover for their health costs at all.
The second element, insurance against lasting changes in the individual
profile of expected health costs, is even more important for insured indi-
viduals, but it is also less widespread. In fact, while it is conventional in
public health insurance or public health-care systems, it is not included in
most private health-insurance contracts.6 This element requires absence of
any risk rating or long-term contracts with clauses that inhibit regular risk
re-assessment. If this element is missing from a given system of health-cost
coverage, individuals end up paying risk-adjusted premiums that follow
risk-specific profiles of expected health costs (as those shown in Figure 2).
If the health-status risk is taken care of, and if there are no further elem-
ents of insurance or redistribution, annual premiums tend to correspond
6 German private health-insurance contracts with ‘substitutional’ cover appear to be the
only major exemption (see Baumann et al. 2008 for further details).
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to the average profile of expected health costs (Figure 1). The upshot of
this is that risk-specific annual premiums can become prohibitively high at
higher ages. Older individuals may therefore drop out of private health
insurance with annual risk rating, using public health insurance or public
health-care systems as a fallback.7 By contrast, being covered by a public
system usually entails the option of a lifelong membership. Indeed, it
typically offers full cover even for those who are born as high risks—a
service that market-driven insurance would never provide.
The third element, intertemporal burden smoothing, typically builds on
the second one, shifting financial burdens related to a given time profile of
annual health costs across the life cycle. As a rule, it implies that premiums
exceed current health costs for young individuals, while they fall short of
expected health costs for the old. Note that this type of ‘age-related redis-
tribution’ does not necessarily lead to interpersonal redistribution, as the
present-value effects of these intertemporal shifts could cancel out over
time. However, this is typically not the case in public systems where
burden smoothing is mostly a by-product of financing health costs
through age-invariant contribution rates or tax rates.8 Alternatively,
this element could be formally reflected in some amount of pre-funding
for health cost of older individuals—an option which may become
increasingly important in the course of demographic ageing. Thus far,
however, most public schemes are unfunded, so that burden
smoothing leads to implicit liabilities of public health funds vis-a`-vis
younger cohorts.
If health funds only provide the elements of insurance considered here,
lifetime premiums or contributions imposed on each insured individual are
linked to average cost profiles (such as those presented in Section 2.1) by
actuarial calculations, even if they do not follow these profiles year by
year. In reality, however, these elements of insurance are often mixed with
one or more of the elements of redistribution discussed below, which can
entirely disconnect contributions from benefits at the individual level.
Furthermore, in systems incorporating the second and the third of these
elements, portability becomes an issue whenever individuals are willing to
switch from one health fund to another. The reason is that these individ-
uals are party to long-term relationships in which payments made by the
individual, and services provided by their health funds, need no longer be
balanced on an annual basis.
7 If this is restricted by law, individuals should be reluctant to buy private cover in the first
place.
8 Another approach is given by differentiated membership rules for workers and pen-
sioners, as in the USA. There, public provision for the majority of individuals sets in
exactly when people retire.
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(b) Additional elements of redistribution
In public systems of health-cost cover, a considerable amount of redistri-
bution can be involved in how health costs are actually funded. Again, the
various forms of redistribution can be condensed into three basic elements
that are not universal, but certainly widespread and used in different
intensities and combinations: (i) income-related redistribution; (ii)
noncontributory cover for dependents; and (iii) intergenerational
redistribution.
Redistribution from rich to poor arises from the fact that, based on
normative convictions that a majority of people would subscribe to,
public health insurance or public health-care systems are typically
designed to give everyone access to a comprehensive set of health services,
regardless of individual abilities to pay for that. Usually, this is brought
about by contributions imposed on wages or pension benefits or by taxes
imposed on income or consumption which are used to finance these
schemes, while all members are entitled to receive a uniform package of
benefits. Individuals with higher income may thus be paying substantially
more than their expected health costs, while individuals with no income at
all can effectively be free of charge.
A distinct type of redistribution involved in a number of public schemes
is that children and nonworking spouses of insured individuals may also
have cover for their health costs without incurring any additional charges,
irrespective of the level income of their household. Providing noncontribu-
tory cover for children may in fact not appear as redistribution in systems
that are unfunded—as they are actually funded by these children’s future
earnings capacities. It simply means that children are credited health costs
arising early in their life cycle, while they are expected to pay back this
implicit loan later on, when they have entered their period of economic
activity.
This leads to the last element of existing arrangements of health-cost
cover, viz. redistribution between subsequent generations. This type of
redistribution arises with some necessity if financial burdens through
health costs are shifted intertemporally in unfunded systems. In schemes
of this kind, the present value of benefit entitlements of each age cohort is
typically lower than the present value of their contributions (see Sinn 2000
for an in-depth explanation using unfunded pension schemes as an exam-
ple). This may become difficult to assess for systems that do not mainly
rely on ear-marked contributions but are financed from general taxation,
including consumption taxes. However, it holds true as a basic feature for
most existing systems of public health insurance or public health services.
All these elements of redistribution are potentially relevant for the port-
ability of health-cost cover and for the design of appropriate rules, as they
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all imply that contributions and benefit entitlements are no longer linked
to each other at the individual level. Things are even more complicated
with respect to intergenerational redistribution involved in unfunded
schemes. Here, even the sum of all contributions of a given age cohort
may not equal the sum of all health costs for the same group of individuals
(but typically exceeds it by a certain margin which increases if the insured
population is ageing). In addition, preferences with respect to a desirable
extent of redistribution in any of the dimensions considered here may
differ substantially across countries. International agreements addressing
the redistributive features of national health systems may thus be difficult
to reach. Isolating national systems of redistribution against each other
may thus be an important aspect in designing portability rules.
3.2 Expected net health costs: the key to portability
Most public health systems are offering long-term relationships in which
the balance of payments made and services received by average members
systematically shifts around over time, governed by the various elements
of insurance and redistribution described in Section 3.1. Yet, as these
schemes typically have no pre-funding, all transactions between insured
individuals and health funds that occurred in earlier periods are past his-
tory. Whenever an individual considers becoming mobile, there is nothing
left of premiums or contributions made up until then to fund for future
health costs of the individual. Therefore, the consequences of mobility for
national systems of health-cost cover—in sending as well as in receiving
countries—need to be determined in a forward-looking perspective.
From the perspective of sending countries, future contributions are rev-
enues foregone, and future benefit entitlements are (implicit) liabilities that
will be wiped out if the individual moves away. In receiving countries,
new liabilities are created and additional revenues are going to accrue if
the individual is admitted to enter the health system there. Meaningful
portability should take all these consequences into account; however,
existing legal arrangements either neglect them (for migrant workers) or
make them a reason why other individuals (for example, pensioners)
are not admitted to the receiving countries’ health systems (unless they
have acquired at least some amount of pension entitlements in this
country).
(a) Expected health costs: determinants
To clarify things, we consider a simple formal model which captures all
relevant characteristics of the individuals covered and all relevant features
of existing health systems (see also Holzmann and Koettl 2011, Sections 3
and 5, who address portability in social insurance in a broader fashion,
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with some applications to health care). The starting point for our
considerations are lifetime profiles of expected health costs of a given
individual arising within a given health system, as those shown in
Section 2. Technically, these profiles are vectors of annual health costs,
AHCg,ja , for individuals of gender g 2 ff, mg (females and males) in risk
class j 2 fl, hg (low or high) at age a 2 f0, 1 . . .!g (! being the age at which
the survival probability is set to zero in current life tables). Typically,
data of this kind are based on a cross section, that is, all age-specific
health costs refer to a single year of observation. For our purposes, we
effectively need longitudinal data, implying that we need to estimate future
trends, at an aggregate level as well as for each individual. For simplicity,
we restrict attention to two risk classes, viz. low risks who are basically
healthy and (average) high risks whose health costs are permanently
increased.
In what follows, we effectively concentrate on annual health costs that
arise starting from a particular age a when an individual migrates to
another country or to another health system. To do so, we need to take
into account the probability that the individual will survive until age aþ 1,
g,ja (with 0 < 
g,j
a < 1 for a < !), and subsequently to any higher age (with
g,j! ¼ 0) assuming, with some sense of realism, that survival probabilities
are differentiated not only by age, but also by gender and risk status (with
g,la  g,ha ). For those who are currently low risks, we also need to take
into account that they may continue to be low risks at age with probabil-
ity a (in the range 0 < a < 1), or that they may experience a deterior-
ation in their health status with probability 1 a. For convenience, we
assume that the probability of a change in health status may vary with age
but does not significantly vary by gender. It is possible to let these prob-
abilities change over time, for instance, to reflect expected improvements
in age-specific health status that go along with higher longevity. This
would imply that the structure of health-cost profiles is slightly changed
against those shown in Section 2.
Besides these life cycle changes in relevant characteristics of the individ-
ual, we need to consider future increases in age-specific health costs
through an annual health-cost inflation factor, 1þ c, in order to fully
approach profiles which are meant to be longitudinal—and spanning
into the future. This factor may differ from general price inflation and
is simply assumed to be constant here. Also, to render annual health costs
measured as a longitudinal profile for a given individual comparable
across time, we need to assess them in terms of present values using an
annual discount factor, 1þ r, which is again assumed to be constant. In
theory, c > 1 and r > 1 must hold, while they can safely be assumed to
exceed zero, certainly in terms of long-term averages, in reality.
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(b) Expected health costs: differentiation by risk status
Building on these ingredients, we can calculate expected future health
costs, EHCg,ja , for individuals of gender g in risk class j at age a. For
individuals who are high risks, expected health costs are simply given by
the sum of annual health costs for a high risk arising from age a onward,
weighted with the relevant survival probabilities, uprated with health-cost
inflation, and discounted to form present values for the current period
(with nf0, 1 . . .gt 2 f0, 1 . . .g being a time index that is equal to zero for
the current year).
EHCg,ha ¼
X!a
t¼1
ð1þ cÞt
ð1þ rÞt
Yaþt1
x¼a
g,hx AHC
g,h
aþt
" #
ð1Þ
Alternatively, we can also use a recursive formula which simply adds the
present value of annual health costs for a high risk expected for the next
year of life, appropriately weighted and uprated, to expected future health
costs of a high risk assessed from the perspective of this next year. This
alternative version reads
EHCg,ha ¼
1þ c
1þ r 
g,h
a AHC
g,h
aþ1 þ EHCg,haþ1
 
: ð10Þ
A recursive formula of this type is actually needed to express expected
future health costs for individuals who are currently low risks, as they may
become high risks with some probability at any point in time in the future.
Expected lifetime health costs for low risks are thus given by
EHCg,la ¼
1þ c
1þ r 
g,l
a
 a AHCg,laþ1 þ EHCg,laþ1
 
þ ð1 aÞ AHCg,haþ1 þ EHCg,haþ1
 h i
,
ð2Þ
a generic formula for expected future health costs for individuals in any
risk status being
EHCg,ja ¼
1þ c
1þ r 
g,j
a
 a AHCg,jaþ1 þ EHCg,jaþ1
 þ ð1 aÞ AHCg,haþ1 þ EHCg,haþ1 h i:
ð3Þ
(c) Noncontributory cover for dependents
If an individual has dependents with noncontributory cover, we can rein-
terpret equation (3) as a formula for assessing expected future health costs
for this individual i, with gender gi, risk status ji, and age ai, the relevant
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intermediate result being EHCgi,jiai . To obtain total expected future health
costs linked to this individual, we have to add health costs for a partner
and for each of the N children (numbered n 2 f1, . . .Ng) who are eligible
for additional cover. The relevant amount of expected future health costs
is then given by
EHCg,ja ¼ EHCgi,jiai þ pEHCgp,jpap þ
XN
n¼1
kanEHC
gn,jn
an , ð4Þ
where p 2 f0, 1g and kan 2 f0, 1g are eligibility counters applying to part-
ners and children, respectively. In equation (4), expected future health
costs for eligible partners, EHCgp,jpap , are calculated as in equation (3),
taking into account the partner’s gender, risk status, and age. When cal-
culating expected future health costs for each eligible child, EHCgn,jnan , the
formula stated in equation (3) must be applied to the periods until an ¼ 
(not an ¼ !),  being the last year of age in which children can be expected
to be eligible for noncontributory cover through (one of) their parents.
(d) Long-term sustainability of financing health care
When assessing the amount of expected future health costs arising for a
given individual in a given system of health-cost cover, we also have to
address the fact that this system may not be ‘sustainable’ over the time
horizon of our calculations or, eventually, in terms of the intertemporal
government budget constraint.9 In other words, based on the equations
derived here thus far, we may account for future health costs that are not
going to arise at all for those who continue to have cover from the system,
simply because it will have to be reformed, for instance, if health-cost
inflation c is too high or if the age composition of the insured population
is expected to deteriorate.10 The easiest way to deal with this complication
is to apply a uniform sustainability factor 1 s (with 0 < s < 1) to
expenditure accruing in each year in the future. Here, s is meant to reflect
the overall degree of nonsustainability of the health system under current
rules. Adjusting our calculations, we then obtain ‘sustainable future health
costs’, SHCg,ja , given by
SHCg,ja ¼ ð1 sÞEHCg,ja : ð5Þ
9 See Blanchard (1990) for a conceptual clarification of what ‘sustainability’ means from a
public-finance point of view. In EU Economic Policy Committee (2001, 2003) this notion
is nowadays used to monitor public finances in a long-term perspective in EU countries
(and, occasionally, also in other developed countries, see Hauner et al. 2007) for practical
purposes, taking future health expenditure into account.
10 In both cases, future health expenditure could not be financed using a constant share in
GDP of the respective country, i.e. from constant contribution rates or a constant frac-
tion in tax revenues in an otherwise unchanged environment (see Subsection e).
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(e) Expected revenues for financing health care
Future health costs essentially turn into future expenditure saved if an indi-
vidual is actually leaving a national system of health-cost cover. Of course,
expected financial contributions to this system which the individual could
have made in the future are no less important. Around the world, ear-
marked contributions specifically collected for health funds, injections
from general-government budgets that are mainly tax-financed, or some
mixture between these two instruments play a dominant role in this area.
We thus take annual ‘tax’ revenues, Taðyg,ja Þ, that are raised from each
individual and channelled into the health system as the basis for assessing
expected financial contributions. These revenues are derived from a generic
tax function Ta which may differ by tax payers’ age and is applied to a tax
base yg,ia that is assumed to consist of wages and pensions mainly, but may
comprise other income, consumption, or any combinations of these com-
ponents as well. In any case, the tax base may vary by gender, health status,
and age owing to the rules applied as well as the ability to pay taxes.
Building on a time series of annual tax payments conditioned on relevant
characteristics of a given individual, we can determine the present value of
expected future tax revenues that the individual would have to pay under
current rules. In its most generic form, the relevant formula reads
ETg,ja ¼
1þ w
1þ r 
g,j
a
 a Taþ1ðyg,jaþ1Þ þ ETg,jaþ1
 þ ð1 aÞ Taþ1ðyg,haþ1Þ þ ETg,haþ1 h i:
ð6Þ
This assessment follows a similar logic as the assessment of expected
future health costs, with a recursive structure to allow for changes in
risk status at any point in time in the future. The factor 1þ w (with
w > 1) reflects increases in the average tax base at the individual level.
We assume that the tax function is regularly adjusted to wage inflation,
that is, within a given period the tax function Tamay well exhibit progres-
sion with respect to the tax base yg,ia , while it behaves as if it were linear in
an intertemporal perspective. Also, we neglect potential future increases in
contribution rates, tax rates, etc., which could contribute to future sus-
tainability of the system on the expenditure side.
(f) Expected net costs of migrants
The final result of our calculations regarding the financial consequences of
an individual leaving a system of health-cost cover and entering another
system located elsewhere are given by expected future net costs, ENCg,ja ,
(or surpluses, as it may be) related to the membership of this individual,
ENCg,ja ¼ SHCg,ja  ETg,ja : ð7Þ
498 CESifo Economic Studies, 61, 2/2015
M. Werding and S. R. McLennan
ENCs calculated for a given individual (and all dependents with noncon-
tributory cover) can be larger than, equal to, or smaller than zero. They
are determined by individual characteristics of those who consider migrat-
ing as well as by features of the health systems which would be affected.
For the sending country A, ENCg,ja,A measures the net costs saved, or the
surplus foregone, if a particular individual actually leaves the national
health system—compared with a situation where it has continued, and
eventually lifelong cover. For a receiving country B, ENCg,ja,B measures
net costs incurred, or surpluses accruing, if the individual is admitted to
the health system in this country.
When letting go a migrant, health funds in the sending country may thus
effectively wish to claim ENCg;ja;A
  if ENCg,ja,A < 0; they may be willing to
pay up to ENCg,ja,A
  if ENCg,ja,A > 0. Conversely, when accepting a migrant,
health funds in the receiving country may be willing to pay (in brackets:
they may wish to claim) ENCg,ja,B
  if ENCg,ja,B < 0 ðENCg,ja,B > 0Þ. Ideally, to
establish portability the two health funds involved could thus compensate
each other for any net costs avoided or net costs incurred, based on the
net-present-value positions in both health systems. In many cases that
matter in reality, a compensation scheme building on this idea will lead
to mutually beneficial solutions, but this is not ensured for all situations
that may arise (see Section 4.4 for further discussion).
Note that the same logic can also be applied to temporary moves, pro-
vided they last long enough that transferring the provision of insurance for
health costs appears to be worthwhile. If the temporary move lasts for d
years, health funds in the sending country may wish to claim (or pay)
ENCg,ja,A  ENCg,jaþd,A
  if this difference is negative (respectively positive).
That is, expected net costs accruing in the more remote future need to be
deducted from the result applying to a case where mobility is open-ended
or expected to last indefinitely. Conversely, health funds in the receiving
country may be willing to pay (or claim) ENCg,ja,B  ENCg,jaþd,B
  if this dif-
ference is negative (respectively positive). In any case, the formula we have
derived here can be easily applied pro rata temporis, the shortest duration
of an expected stay under the rules of a foreign health system for which
this makes sense probably being 1 year.
4 Portability Rules
We will now highlight in more detail the problems that may arise from a
lack of portability (Section 4.1). Against this background, we will then
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discuss the options for establishing some form of ‘portability’ in health
care and health-cost cover (Section 4.2). Specifically, we will propose a
solution based on transfers between national health funds, providing
simulations that are meant to illustrate how the scheme could work in
reality and what further issues might turn up if it is put into practical use
(see Sections 4.3 and 4.4).
4.1 Problems arising from a lack of portability
(a) For potential migrants
An extreme form of nonportability arises if migrants drop out of their
earlier system of health-cost cover, but do not get access to the system in
their destination country. In less extreme forms, migrants may not be
offered comparable cover at comparable costs in a new system since net
contributions they have made in their earlier system are neglected. Any of
these cases may give rise to concerns regarding the migrants’ social and
financial situation (see Avato et al. 2009, pp. 455–56). In addition, the
existence, or simply the fear, of these consequences may affect individual
decisions.
Most importantly, lack of portability of health-cost cover may discour-
age individuals from migrating,11 even where it can be expected to increase
social welfare (from a global perspective). The same may apply to deci-
sions to migrate home later on. It may also affect migrants’ choices
between different target countries, or between different jobs within a
given country.12 In any of these cases, individuals respond to differences
in access to health-cost cover in a way that is individually rational, but
does not lead to efficient location choices or to an efficient allocation of
labor. Lack of portability may thus not only be detrimental with respect to
actual migrants. It also affects potential migrants and may even have a
negative impact on labor market performance and economic dynamics for
society at large, both in potential source and target countries.
(b) For health funds and other members of their risk pools
If health funds could charge new members with risk-adjusted premiums
that are based on actuarial calculations, mobility of individuals and a lack
of portability would not be a problem for insurers and other immobile
11 In an empirical study, Geis et al. (2013) show that quality of the health-care system in the
destination country appears to attract migration, while they are unable to control for the
cost of paying for health care in separation, i.e. as distinct from the negative effects of a
more general ‘tax’ measure.
12 For instance, Avato et al. (2009, p. 455) point to the possibility that a lack of access to
health care or health insurance (or lack of portability thereof) may drive migrants into
working in the informal sector.
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members of a given risk pool. In this case, the problems would fall exclu-
sively on individuals who consider moving from one scheme of health-cost
cover to another, taking on the form of financial losses or a lock-in to a
current health fund. However, existing systems of public health insurance
or public health care conventionally insure current health costs and long-
term health-status risks without risk-rating, and their funding often
involves redistribution along several dimensions. The exit of a high-in-
come low-risk individual or the entry of a low-income high-risk individual
can therefore bring about financial losses or increased costs that impose a
burden on other members of the same risk pool. Of course, the opposite is
true for the entry of a low-risk individual or the exit of a high-risk
individual.
In times when international mobility was more limited, the resulting
increases (or reductions) in contribution rates or taxes may have been
negligible. With higher mobility, however, this has become more promin-
ent. The ultimate problem that arises for health funds and their immobile
members is a process of risk segmentation which could be fuelled endogen-
ously once it has reached a certain stage. Health systems that are relatively
expensive owing to an unfavorable structure of insured risks are then less
and less attractive for those who are relatively good risks, so that the latter
have an additional incentive to move away. At the same time, these indi-
viduals are attracted by countries with health funds covering risk pools
with a more favorable structure. This problem may have far-reaching
consequences which not only affect national health systems but broader
prospects for economic development and social cohesion within and
between the countries affected.
While risk segmentation mainly relates to the structure of health risks
insured in different systems, redistributive elements of national health sys-
tems may also play a role in this context. Health funds that are rather
generous in terms of redistribution may attract migrants, specifically those
with low income or many dependents who would benefit most, while
health funds with little redistribution may deter them. While a process
of risk segmentation leaves little room for manoeuver, distortions of
migration incentives through redistribution can be removed by scaling
back the amount of redistribution involved in national health systems.
But, as is well-known from the literature on fiscal competition, this may
lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ (see Sinn 2003, chapter 3) and is also likely to
become detrimental for incumbent populations—at least at some point.
4.2 Options for establishing portability
Portability of health-cost cover for individuals who are internationally
mobile can effectively mean different things. It could refer to any kind
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of continuation of coverage, irrespective of the precise terms and condi-
tions that apply. In this weak sense, portability is established whenever
individuals do not drop out of health insurance entirely when migrating
abroad, which clearly avoids the worst kinds of portability problems.
Alternatively, portability could be meant to imply that coverage is con-
tinued without any change in the terms applying—an outcome that is
rather difficult to accomplish in the context of health care, as it mainly
consists of benefits in kind which are delivered under conditions and in
specific forms that are mostly determined at the local level. This strong
notion would amount to identical continuation of coverage, rather than
portability.
Somewhere in between these two extremes, portability can also mean
that individuals are transferred to a new scheme of health-cost cover where
they are treated comparably favorable as before, given the particular fea-
tures of the two systems involved. In addition, reasonable rules for port-
ability ought to make sure that other members of the health systems
involved do not bear financial losses, or do not make windfall gains, as
a consequence of some individuals becoming mobile. This latter notion
of comparable continuation under a different system and the absence of
external costs and benefits is what we prefer to call ‘full portability’ in this
article. Holzmann and Koettl (2011, p. 11) add a third criterion. Besides
the absence of ‘benefit disadvantages’ for migrants and ‘fiscal fairness’ for
sending and receiving countries, they ask for ‘bureaucratic effectiveness’
both for the institutions involved and for migrants.
Against this background, the current legal framework for international
portability of health-care benefits and health-cost cover for migrant work-
ers appears to be untargeted, inconsistent, and also potentially harmful for
at least one of the three parties involved: individuals who consider migrat-
ing, other members of the health fund that they are about to leave, or that
they are going to enter. The framework is untargeted because, for cases of
migrant workers and their family members, it simply ignores any conse-
quences for health-care systems—making admission to a health fund in
the destination country an annex to their work permit, and not taking care
at all of the effects for health funds in the source country. The framework
is inconsistent as other categories of migrants, for instance pensioners, are
treated very differently. Current rules make sure that all types of migrants
are attributed to some source of health-cost cover, but consequences that
are potentially harmful are imposed on national health schemes and their
other members.
There are basically two options for establishing regimes for interna-
tional portability of health-care benefits in an appropriate way.
Following changes in residence or work place which are permanent or
temporary (but of some length), migrants could (i) stay under the coverage
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of their source-country system indefinitely, combined with reimburse-
ments that are paid to health funds in foreign countries for any health
services received there, or (ii) they could be moved to the target country’s
system of health-cost funding, combined with mutual compensations
based on the expected financial consequences of such moves for each of
the two systems involved.
The first option amounts to a generalization of the rules currently in
place for migrants who are not considered as workers or workers’ family
members. These rules are then no longer applied selectively to those cases
in which target-country systems are afraid of making financial losses.
Continued coverage for migrants would be guaranteed under this solution.
Access to health services and quality of treatment would largely depend on
characteristics of the health-care system in the destination country, while
all financial consequences could be dealt with through reimbursements
that ought to be assessed as carefully as possible in terms of actual fees
for services. In a stylized setting, this approach appears to be sufficiently
targeted and operative, but there are a number of limitations to it.
An important difficulty arises from the question of whether migrants
should be treated according to the principles effective in their destination
country or in their source country. Applying the rules of the destination
country is not only a matter of social inclusion of migrants who live in this
place. It also has an important practical side, as otherwise health funds
located in this country would have to apply foreign social-protection law
of all the countries where immigrants have been received from, which may
well turn out infeasible. Yet, if health services for migrants are provided in
line with the destination country’s rules, health funds in the source country
are losing control over part of the health costs they have to pay for.
Managing health care, that is, guiding providers’ as well as patients’ activ-
ities through public regulation or direct contracts, is then no longer pos-
sible as far as health costs accruing for emigrants are concerned. If the
number of emigrants is low, this may not be considered very important.
With increasing mobility at an international level, however, this may well
become a problem in a growing number of countries.
The second option fully acknowledges the fact that health services for
migrants can be provided most easily in their destination country and that
principles for funding these services are often designed to fit to specific
patterns of supply and demand in a given health system. Ideally, provision
of services and sources of health-cost funding for individuals who are
internationally mobile should therefore be located in just one country at
a time. However, moving individuals—workers, their family member, pen-
sioners, etc.—to another system of health-cost cover requires a system of
transfers between their former and future health funds that compensate
for the resulting changes in expected net costs accruing at both ends.
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Considering the difficulties involved in the option of continued coverage in
the source-country system with reimbursements for services received
abroad, this option is our preferred solution for ensuring full portability.
4.3 Full portability through transfers between health systems
Ensuring full portability in health-cost coverage by offering migrants com-
parable cover in their destination countries and by introducing compen-
sating payments between health funds to avoid external costs, processes of
risk-segmentation, and a race to the bottom with respect to redistributive
elements attached to health-cost coverage, is a basic idea that immediately
derives from our calculations in Section 3.2. In the absence of such pay-
ments, these calculations indicate financial losses arising in at least one of
the two health funds involved from exits or entries of mobile individuals.
Essentially, expected net costs avoided in one place (or, alternatively,
expected net surpluses accruing there) have to be transferred to cover
expected net costs incurred (or expected net surpluses foregone) in the
other place in order to guarantee coverage under comparable conditions
for actual migrants and, eventually, to avoid a process of international risk
segmentation in health-cost coverage.
The nature of the compensating payments we have in mind is that of
severance charges or redemption fees which are well-known also in other
contexts.13 Here, they are needed owing to liabilities and entitlements
related to the life cycle dimension of health risks and to the long-term
cover provided for these risks in many existing health systems. Besides the
elements of insurance involved in a given scheme, intertemporal burden
smoothing and intra- and intergenerational redistribution may also con-
tribute to the need for, and the size of, these transfers. Building on the
conceptual framework we have developed above, payments are assessed
based on (quasi-)actuarial principles. This is not only an obvious way of
13 Therefore, a prerequisite for the compensation mechanism devised here to work is a
mutually exclusive definition of who is covered by which national scheme, even for
tax-financed national health systems where no strong notion of membership exists.
Cases of dual coverage, e.g. one based on nationality in the home country and another
one based on residence or employment in the destination country, should be ruled out. A
model for how this can be done without much administrative problems is provided by the
EU health insurance card that each individual has to show upon treatment where it is not
a registered patient. If, later on, migrants drop out of health-cost cover in their destin-
ation country and return home ill and poor, they will usually be entitled to receiving
health care in their home country through their citizenship, at least as an annex to other
benefits, such as income support. For this case, home countries could retain the right of
re-adjusting the earlier arrangement to a temporary compensation if they had been
paying a fee. If they had been receiving a payment, they may question the right of the
destination country to terminate the insurance provided to the migrant. However, if this
is not clearly regulated in the underlying bilateral agreement, the position of home
countries may be weak in this respect.
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approaching the insurance side of health-cost funding, it also provides a
benchmark for how to deal with the redistribution that is legislated and
operated at a national level. In this respect, the idea is to isolate systems
with differing features against each other and leave the elements, and the
actual amount, of redistribution under national responsibility (see Section
5 for further discussion).
4.4 Illustrative calculations
To illustrate what we have in mind, we now use the framework developed
in Section 3.2 for actually estimating the direction and size of compensat-
ing transfers that would be needed to ensure full portability of health-cost
cover for individuals with differing characteristics who are willing to
change their work place or residence. We will do so building on the
health-cost profiles shown in Section 2.1 (again using Germany and
Poland as examples).
From the profiles of annual health costs in public health insurance
schemes operated in these two countries (cf. Figures 1 and 2), we can
first determine expected health costs for individuals over their remaining
life span, differentiated by gender, age, and health status. Information
regarding age-specific survival probabilities is taken from current releases
of national life tables (for the entire population, as provided by the stat-
istical offices of Germany and Poland). In addition, we need to define
expected rates of health-cost inflation and interest rates that appear to
be plausible when applied over a longer time span into the future.
Effectively, we are setting health-cost inflation to constant real rates of
about 1.7 and 2.3% in Germany and Poland, respectively,14 while the real
interest rate is uniformly set to 3% in both cases. The results of these
operations can be displayed in terms of time profiles of health costs
expected for each additional year of life of individuals of given gender,
age, and health status. Figure 3 shows a narrow selection of sample pro-
files, concentrating on males aged 25 (‘young migrants’) and 65 (‘pen-
sioners’) years, reflecting the differentiation by current health status and
the variation across countries, while disregarding the effects of discounting
future health costs.
Figure 3 also includes rough estimates of expected contributions that
migrants could be expected to pay for health insurance. To obtain these
estimates, we use stylized wage profiles for males and females derived from
14 These figures reflect annual average increases of per-capita health costs in the ‘EU ref-
erence scenarios’, as projected in European Commission and EU Economic Policy
Committee (2009).
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German micro-data (as in Fenge et al. 2006),15 expected real rates of
future wage growth (1.7% in Germany, 2.3% in Poland, as in European
Commission and EU Economic Policy Committee 2009), and current rates
of public health-insurance contributions applied in both countries (14.9%
in Germany, with an upper threshold on earnings subjected to contribu-
tions; 9% in Poland, where no such ceiling exists). From wage profiles and
national benefit formulas, we also estimate pension entitlements accumu-
lated in the public pension schemes of both countries, imposing health-
insurance contributions on pensions when individuals reach the statutory
age limit (at age 65 years in both countries).
With proper discounting, expected health costs and revenues can then be
aggregated (over each profile) and subtracted from each other to obtain
expected future net costs of individuals, differentiated by gender, age, and
risk status. At this stage, we also apply a ‘sustainability factor’ (see Section
3.2d: a discount on future health costs of 4.2% for Germany, 3.2% for
Poland, based on European Commission 2009).16 Figure 4 displays the
final results for German and Polish males, clearly demonstrating how
results vary with (current) age and health status. In addition, the figure
also points to considerable cross-country differences in risk-specific and
age-related net health costs.
Some of the results shown in this figure are also included in Table 1
(at 10-year intervals), complemented with parallel results obtained for
women. Table 2 shows further results relating to under-aged children
who have cover as dependents, as this information is needed to estimate
expected future net costs for larger households.17
15 These wage profiles are measured as multiples of current average wages to make them
portable over time and across countries. Here, they are applied to year 2010 average
wages for active members of the German social insurance system, while relevant average
wages for Poland are taken from Eurostat data on average wages observed in 2010.
There is thus no genuine differentiation by health status in the wage profiles we have
constructed; (small) differences in contributions which show up in Figure 3 are a result of
differences in survival probabilities.
16 These figures reflect the infinite-time-horizon (‘S2’) measure of ‘sustainability gaps’
involved in public finances of these countries. They are derived from long-term projec-
tions for several types of age-related public spending, including public health expend-
iture. Of course, corrections paying closer attention to future trends in health
expenditure alone would be desirable. For instance, overall sustainability factors could
be adjusted here based on whether projected increases in health expenditure are (less than
or more than) proportional to projected increases in all types of age-related public
spending. This may be given further attention when the scheme we are sketching is
actually considered for practical use.
17 These results are directly derived from expected health costs accruing until age 18
years, while children are assumed not to make any contributions as long as they have
health-cost cover through their parents. It is disputable whether, when assessing expected
net costs of children, one should look further ahead. Besides the effects for the future life
cycle of young adults, one could even include an expected number of grandchildren, etc.
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The figures produced here reveal that, according to our simulations,
age-related profiles of expected net costs share some basic features
across the two national health systems we are looking at. Net costs for
young males at low or average health risks are clearly negative, indicating
a considerable surplus of expected contributions over expected costs. They
become positive between age 40 and 50 years and peak around the retire-
ment age. Afterward they are declining as contingent survival probabilities
decrease. These fundamental trends apply to individuals at high risk as
well. However, for obvious reasons the level of net costs is substantially
higher, so that high risks are expected to impose net costs on their health
systems throughout. All these trends are similar for females but, across all
risk categories, expected net costs for young women start at substantially
Figure 4 Expected future net health costs of males in EU-15 and EU-12 coun-
tries, differentiated by age and risk status (2010). Levels adjusted to reflect data
for German and Polish public health insurance schemes.
Source: own calculations.
(see Sinn 2001 or Werding and Munz 2005 for applications of this idea in analyses
relating to unfunded public pension schemes). However, while these effects can be size-
able at an aggregate level, they are also subject to high variation and uncertainty at the
individual level. We therefore leave them aside here, assuming that (implicit) contracts
regarding long-term insurance for health costs are first made when individuals start
making independent decisions. These contracts may include health costs of dependents,
but do not automatically extend to life-long cover for these (and all further) descendants.
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higher levels than for males, while they decline somewhat faster toward the
end of the life.18
Besides these common features that are not just artifacts of uniform
assumptions, there are also a few differences between the age-related pro-
files of expected net costs in the two countries. First of all, the increase and
decrease of expected net costs for males is less pronounced in Poland
compared with Germany, but differences are larger for young men than
for older men. The reason for this is that expected health costs increase less
Table 1 Expected future net health costs, differentiated by gender, age, and risk
status
Age (years) Males Females
Low
risk
Average
risk
High
risk
Low
risk
Average
risk
High
risk
EU-15 country (calibrated to data for Germany, 2010)
15 59.707 56.643 32.481 200 2.861 111.982
25 53.405 49.112 40.284 508 3.696 112.243
35 33.547 27.734 58.402 5.001 10.817 108.971
45 9.051 1.088 76.617 18.056 26.256 112.163
55 13.169 24.006 89.834 31.998 43.486 114.386
65 28.193 41.934 92.743 38.451 53.409 106.803
75 21.085 35.005 66.406 26.820 42.263 73.992
85 10.976 21.612 37.326 13.111 24.494 38.876
95 3.747 9.211 14.790 4.361 9.728 14.416
EU-12 country (calibrated to data for Poland, 2010)
15 17.163 16.074 5.704 1.546 2.243 30.329
25 15.296 13.986 6.910 1.513 2.565 29.582
35 10.131 8.555 11.101 3.205 4.628 28.754
45 4.055 2.077 15.809 6.540 8.510 29.393
55 741 3.215 18.296 9.588 12.209 28.660
65 3.219 6.017 17.125 7.814 10.859 22.017
75 2.078 4.637 11.142 4.366 6.974 12.536
85 859 2.734 5.948 1.785 3.478 5.758
95 108 1.064 2.168 521 1.298 2.011
Source: Own calculations. All figures in the table are E net present values denominated in
year 2010 E.
18 The first of these effects is mainly due to differences in labor-force participation and
lower wages from which contributions are levied. The second one derives from the fact
that women’s health costs typically increase less with age than health costs of males do
(see Figure 1 above).
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with age in Poland, while, on relative terms, the profile of expected con-
tributions is more front-loaded there than in Germany (see Figure 3).
Second, the spread in expected net costs between high risks and
low risks is a lot stronger in Germany than it is in Poland. This is
mainly driven by a stronger spread in expected health costs. Third, the
same applies to the spread in expected net costs between females and
males because cross-country differences in the gender wage gap are stron-
ger than cross-country differences in the gender-specific health-cost
differential.
What do all these figures tell us that matters for portability in health-
cost cover? If, for instance, a 25-year-old male in good health migrates
from Poland to Germany in 2010, intending to stay there on a permanent
basis, public health insurance in Poland foregoes an expected net surplus
of future contributions over future health costs of about 24,300 E (see
Tables 1 and 3). At the same time, German public health insurance can
expect to receive a surplus of about 58,250 E. There is thus an overall gain
of 33,950 E, which is effectively some fraction of what is usually called the
‘immigration surplus’ (see Borjas 1995). Also, if the Polish system would
like to claim 24,300 E to avoid negative consequences for other members,
and if the German system’s maximum willingness to pay is 58,250 E, there
appears to be ample room for a mutually beneficial agreement: both sides
could share the surplus, or they could settle to the smaller amount to make
Table 2 Expected future net health costs for under-aged children, differentiated
by gender, age, and risk status
Age (years) Boys Girls
Low
risk
Average
risk
High
risk
Low
risk
Average
risk
High
risk
EU-15 country (calibrated to data for Germany, 2010)
0 14.805 14.823 31.815 13.801 13.818 30.088
5 9.655 9.735 22.786 9.294 9.372 22.071
10 6.002 6.103 14.786 6.156 6.260 15.215
15 2.297 2.358 5.885 2.576 2.646 6.614
EU-12 country (calibrated to data for Poland, 2010)
0 4.694 4.700 9.826 4.372 4.377 9.299
5 2.799 2.822 6.573 2.731 2.754 6.446
10 1.634 1.661 4.014 1.688 1.716 4.158
15 624 640 1.593 674 692 1.728
Source: own calculations. All figures in the table are E net present values denominated in
year 2010 E.
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sure there are no losses—or what is left of the surplus could in fact be
disbursed to the individual.
Interestingly, if the same individual would decide to return home as a
65-year-old 40 years later, the German system might again be prepared to
make a compensating payment to the Polish system. If the individual is
still a low risk (in brackets: has turned into a high risk), German health
funds would save expected net costs of 17,000 E (55,600 E), while the
Polish system would have to take on expected net costs of 13,000 E
(30,950 E), assessed from today’s perspective.19 The resulting overall
gain, hence the room for an agreement, is 4000 E (24,650 E) based on
Table 3 Consequences of international migration for expected future net health
costs, various examples
Case[s] considered Changes in expected future net health costs
In Poland Direction
of migration
In Germany Overall
Singles aged 25 years
Male at low risk 15.296 H 53.405 38.109
Male at high risk 6.910 H 40.284 33.374
Female at low risk 1.513 H 508 2.020
Female at high risk 29.582 H 112.243 82.660
Family of threea 21.181 H 40.112 18.930
Family of fourb 1.302 H 8.102 6.800
Singles aged 65 years
Male at low risk 3.219 G 28.193 24.973
Male at high risk 17.125 G 92.743 75.618
Female at low risk 7.814 G 38.451 30.637
Female at high risk 22.017 G 106.803 84.786
Retired couplec 22.399 G 119.204 96.805
Source: Own calculations. All figures in the table are E net present values denominated in
year 2010 E.
aMale aged 25 years, female aged 25 years, daughter aged <1 years; all at low health risk.
bMale aged 35 years, female aged 30 years, son aged 10 years, daughter aged 5 years; son
at high risk, all others at low risk.
cMale aged 70 years, at high risk; female aged 65 years, at low risk.
19 These figures are not included in Table 2, since the results displayed there relate to
individuals (e.g. 65-year-old males) who migrate today. If this happens in 40 years’
time, current effects have to be uprated (to reflect expected increases in prices of
health services) and then discounted.s
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year 2010 present values—and it will look substantially larger in 2050
when this becomes relevant. If a male aged 65 years migrates in the
same direction today, the overall gain is 11,600 E (53,000 E).
Combining information from the other tables, Table 3 gives a number of
further examples. If, through emigration or immigration, net costs
increase in one of the health systems considered, there is a positive sign
in the relevant column; if net cost decrease, there is a negative sign. The
‘overall’ column sums up the resulting changes, so that a negative sign
there indicates that total expected net costs across the two systems are
decreased through migration, while a positive sign points to an increase in
total expected net costs. Therefore, negative overall effects imply that
there is some leeway for health funds to agree on compensating payments
for potentially harmful losses (surpluses foregone or net costs incurred) on
one side from corresponding gains (net costs avoided or surpluses accru-
ing) on the other side. If overall effects are positive, such an agreement will
be difficult to reach.
The selection of examples covered in Table 3 is clearly arbitrary, but
further cases can easily be assembled from Tables 1 and 2. In most of the
cases considered, migration with unrestricted access for migrants to the
health system in the destination country and with compensating payments
dealing with the problem of external costs or benefits appears to be feas-
ible. Cases where things are different are those of young individuals at a
high health risk who want to migrate from Poland to Germany. According
to our simulations, treatment of high risks is a lot more expensive in
Germany than it is in Poland, so that total expected net costs go up if
these individuals actually migrate. It is interesting to note, however, that
we also include individuals at high risk in some of the examples of couples
or families considered in Table 3. Overall changes in net costs are still
favorable in these cases, since they are dominated by decreases in expected
net costs for other household members. With this kind of ‘family insur-
ance’, increased health risks are thus not necessarily harmful for portabil-
ity and mobility.
If the overall effects of mobility with compensating payments lead to a
decline in expected net costs for individuals with certain characteristics
moving in one direction, they must be unfavorable for mobility of indi-
viduals with the same characteristics who are willing to move in the oppos-
ite direction. By our stylized simulations, this would apply to young
healthy individuals who want to move from Germany to Poland or to
individuals who are older and/or less healthy and want to move from
Poland to Germany. These asymmetries are hardly avoidable, mostly
because they are rooted in actual cost differentials and not in administra-
tive barriers or inappropriate rules. At the same time, actual migration is
mostly flowing in the directions for which portability can be established
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more easily, simply because individuals tend to have incentives to migrate
where migration is likely to be beneficial—not only with respect to systems
of health-cost funding but also in terms of its broader economic effects.
Appropriate rules for the portability of health-care benefits can contribute
to avoiding specific distortions of these incentives. But designing them in
such a way that fundamental incentives are reversed is difficult—and
probably also not advisable.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that systems providing health insurance or
health care are very important for the individuals covered, while interna-
tional portability of health-cost cover is difficult to establish, due to the
long-term nature of insurance provided and additional elements of redis-
tribution that may be included. To establish full portability for individuals
who actually move from one health system to another and to avoid exter-
nal costs or benefits that could arise at both ends, compensating payments
may be needed between the two health funds involved. These payments
should be assessed based on changes in expected net costs (expected health
costs minus expected contributions) for both of the systems involved,
adjusted for health-cost inflation, wage growth, long-term (non-)sustain-
ability, and properly discounted over time.
Compared with existing rules, this solution has a few novel features
which we think important and advantageous. First of all, our proposal
leads to a consistent legal framework for portability of health-cost cover
applying to all types of migrants. It differs from the current ‘package deal’
for migrant workers and their family members in that it actively addresses
potential external costs or windfall gains falling on other members of the
two health funds involved. Second, our proposal allows for a formal trans-
fer of health-fund membership in cases of mobile pensioners (or other
types of nonworking migrants), avoiding a constant need for interaction
between two health systems regarding the provision of services and related
reimbursements. Again, compensating payments which have to be made
just once then contribute to removing external costs or benefits that would
otherwise arise. In any of these cases, our proposal contributes to estab-
lishing continuation of comparable coverage for migrants—to the extent
that this is possible under differing national health systems. Last but not
least, our proposal is easily applicable to cases of temporary migration of
some duration (say, a year or more) for which the responsibility for health-
cost coverage can be fully transferred to the receiving country, while
migrants retain the right to return to full lifelong cover in the sending
country later on. In these cases, compensating payments can be simply
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assessed on a pro-rata basis for the expected duration of the temporary
move.
Transfers that are needed to establish full portability may relate to
genuine cost differentials or to different amounts of redistribution
involved in national health systems. One should thus note that the way
we suggest to assess these transfers (see Section 3.2) does not imply that
elements of redistribution, which are legislated at the national level, are
somehow extended to other countries. Rather, we are proposing a coor-
dinating mechanism which accommodates the coexistence of national
health systems that differ a lot in terms of their redistributive features.
Each country is held fully liable for the insurance as well as the redistri-
bution it has promised to all individuals who are once covered under its
authority. If some of these individuals move away, national health funds
are asked to pay as a compensating transfer up to as much as they would
have had to spend on these individuals anyway, or they are offered up to
as much as they would have extracted from these individuals under con-
tinued coverage. Similarly, countries receiving immigrants are basically
asked to provide them with full health-cost cover in line with their current
rules, while they are offered compensation up to as much as this may cost,
or they are asked to pay up to as much as their health funds may benefit
from additional members. In any case, our proposal makes sure that con-
tinuation of comparable coverage can be provided to individuals who are
willing to migrate, and it avoids external costs and benefits for other
members of the health funds involved.
At the same time, we ought to admit that there are a number of open
questions, more technical ones, but also regarding material aspects, which
may imply practical limitations for the application of our ideas. Data
requirements for making our framework fully operative are limited (see
Section 3). Still, some of the information that is needed may not exist
everywhere. Specifically, the definition of appropriate categories of
health risks and related cost differentials clearly need more empirical
work. Other assumptions and procedures for calculating compensations
between former and future sources of health-cost cover for migrants are
not only a matter of empirical validation, but also of reasonable agree-
ments regarding how to deal with an uncertain future in an acceptable
way. For instance, this relates to the way in which health-cost inflation
and financial sustainability of health systems can be reflected in the pro-
jections required for estimating expected net costs of migrants.
Uncertainty about future developments and asymmetric information
about individual health prospects may in themselves create difficulties
for reaching reasonable agreements. It is possible, but not necessary,
that this gives rise to new barriers to mobility under new rules.
Problems of adverse selection may particularly arise if disbursements to,
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or co-payments of, individuals would play a more than marginal role in
the compensating mechanism. Defining simple indicators of health status,
and agreeing on transparent procedures for assessing compensating pay-
ments between health funds, will thus be important. However, since send-
ing countries are typically disadvantaged in the current framework, while
gains in receiving countries are substantial, nobody should have an inter-
est in blocking mobility if a part of these gains is shared between both sides
by a prudent arrangement. Effectively, the problem of risk segmentation
under existing rules appears to be much more pressing than the possibility
that adverse selection becomes an issue when links between mobility and
health costs are actively addressed.
In terms of material issues that probably need to be considered more
closely, we briefly mentioned that cross-country differences in expected
health costs may reflect differences in cover as well as in the quality of
services provided. This raises the question of what ‘comparable cover’ (see
Section 4.2) really means, and could provide a reason why (part of) the
surpluses of expected net costs in the health system of the sending country
over those in the receiving country could actually be disbursed to the
migrants themselves—to buy additional cover they would otherwise
lose. However, if there are genuine differences in the quality of health-
care systems, comparable cover simply cannot be provided in the destin-
ation country. In this case, migrants may be interested in being moved to
the health system of the destination country only temporarily, keeping up
their entitlements vis-a`-vis the old system for a later period of life, when
health care becomes more important for them and they may be able to
return to the source country.
A related issue that turns up is that compensating payments between
health funds cannot provide for full portability in all cases. If changes in
expected net costs are such that the maximum willingness to pay of one of
the funds is smaller than the amount that the other fund would like to
claim, there is no leeway for a mutually beneficial settlement. This obser-
vation has several implications. Individuals in poor health who are most
likely to be faced with this situation may simply be less likely to migrate.
Countries receiving immigration are also usually interested in attracting
healthy individuals, while they may not easily agree on sharing the extra
costs to alleviate mobility of individuals in poor health. Considering
responsibility for the incumbent population and for a financially sound
situation of the existing social protection system, this position is clearly
defendable. In addition, we have highlighted that this problem has a
strong economic dimension if it is related to cost differentials reflecting
differences in the quality of treatment. Nevertheless, admitting individuals
at high risk without claiming full compensation for the extra costs
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incurred could then be a humanitarian issue or, in contrast, the individuals
themselves could be willing (and able) to pay for the gap that arises.
This leads to a broader discussion of our proposed solution. On first
consideration, the idea of countries claiming or making payments related
to cases of inward and outward migration may sound unusual.
Specifically, source countries may find it politically difficult to regulate
emigration in a corresponding fashion—after the fall of the Iron Curtain
they may even take pride in not doing so in an overly intrusive way.
Furthermore, from an economist’s perspective the freedom to move
(out) is considered to be important, as it basically represents a mechanism
for voting with one’s feet (see Tiebout 1956) establishing competition
between jurisdictions and forcing them to act in their citizens’ interest.
For similar reasons, the right to emigrate freely is in fact even an import-
ant human-rights issue. Nevertheless, some coordination is actually
needed in several fields for this particular type of competition to be genu-
inely fruitful. Well-known examples calling for international agreements
on common basic principles are tax competition and public redistribution
(see, for example, Sinn 2003, chapters 2 and 3). These two cases are clearly
applicable with respect to national health-care systems and national
arrangements for health-cost funding.
Last but not least, we ought to mention that our ideas are not entirely
new. They are in fact reminiscent of the Bhagwati-tax proposal which was
meant to deal with the consequence of a ‘brain drain’ from international
migration for many sending countries (see Bhagwati and Dellalfar 1973 or
Bhagwati 1976). Here, this general idea is brought to bearing in a way that
is specifically targeted at the financial consequences of migration for
national health systems. To make sure that such a piece-meal approach
does not lead to new distortions, our proposal should probably be aug-
mented with similar portability rules applying to other branches of social
protection and public finances. Migrants who are expected to be net-
payers with respect to health care may be net-beneficiaries elsewhere
and vice versa. Similar calculations may therefore be needed for (public)
pension schemes (see, for example, Werding and Munz 2005) and for
further systems providing insurance or redistribution to assess the total
(economic and fiscal) effects of migration.
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